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It’s not over yet (and probably never 
will be) 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies 
And so the New Year emerges with a deal on the table between the 
UK and the EU. The talk is now of Brexit being “done” with the EU-27 
leaders agreeing unanimously on its passage and Parliament in the 
UK having voted resoundingly to approve the agreement (with Sir Keir 
Starmer’s Labour party having been whipped by its leadership into 
supporting the agreement). 
Well might Boris Johnson then claim that the issue of the UK’s 
relationship with the EU has been settled and “put to bed for a 
generation”[1] and that Brexit truly has been ‘done’. But of course, the 
UK’s relationship with the EU has not been settled and the nature of 
the trade agreement reached leaves many glaring gaps. On this one 
can disagree in three key facets. 
First, in terms of a legal process, on the EU side, for the agreement to 
pass into law, it must of course be approved by the European 
Parliament. Given the last minute nature of the agreement, scrutiny 
and ratification of the deal by the EU parliament will have to wait until 
February or March. Whilst it is unlikely that the deal will be rejected by 
MEPs, it can only be provisionally applied until their assent is 
obtained. 
Second, the deal itself contains a number of provisions that have 
served to “kick the can” down the road as it were, but with the effect 
that in a number of years, certain areas will need to be renegotiated or 
reviewed. 
The most obvious example here is fishing, whereby the trade 
agreement commits both parties to a five-and-a-half year transition 
period (including the right of incumbent EU vessels to continue fishing 
between 6 to 12 miles off the UK coast) before a transfer of EU quota 
to the UK takes place. Furthermore, the agreement also commits both 
parties to a four year cycle of reviews, with the aim of “considering 
whether arrangements, including in relation to access to waters, can 
be further codified and strengthened” (UK-EU Draft Trade Agreement, 
Article FISH.18: Review Clause).[2] 
More generally, in terms of governance of the agreement, the EU 
concern over a level playing field and avoiding the potential for “unfair 
competition” by the UK had been a major stumbling block in the 
negotiations that could have scuppered the whole agreement. As 
such, the text of the agreement is vouched in terms of “fair 
competition” and “sustainable development”, with the achievement of 
climate neutrality by 2050 from both parties. 
However, there is some ambiguity over the final wording of the 
commitment to regulatory alignment, as stated on page 179 of the 
draft agreement:[3] 
“The Parties affirm their common understanding that their economic 
relationship can only deliver benefits in a mutually satisfactory way if 
the commitments relating to a level playing field for open and fair 
competition stand the test of time, by preventing distortions of trade or 
investment, and by contributing to sustainable development. However 
the Parties recognise that the purpose of this Title is not to 
harmonise the standards of the Parties. The Parties are 
determined to maintain and improve their respective high 
standards in the areas covered by this Title” (emphasis added). 
Whilst the EU had sought a lockstep mechanism to ensure dynamic 
regulatory alignment, the UK fought for a looser mechanism. 
Ultimately, the parties have agreed that the terms of trade should be 
reviewed at most every four years in order to assess whether the 
agreement still maintains an appropriate balance between protecting 
against unfair competition and facilitating trade and investment. An 
earlier review is possible in the event that substantial remedial 
measures have been taken due to a policy of one side having a 
significant impact on competition due to labour standards, state aid 
provisions or environmental standards, amongst others. 
However, a basic commitment to non-regression (with the upholding 
of the Precautionary Principle for areas such as agriculture and the 
environment in the draft agreement particularly noteworthy[4]) would 
appear to suggest that the UK’s room to manoeuvre for regulatory 
divergence is limited, as for example, the section on labour and social 
standards (page 200 of the draft agreement)[5] would attest. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that this only affects areas 
that directly impact trade and investment, suggesting somewhat 
greater scope to diverge from previous EU norms than had hitherto 
been the case. 
The agreement is quite explicit in terms of upholding existing labour 
standards in place in the UK (as at the end of the transition period) for 
the areas of: fundamental rights at work; occupational health and 
safety standards; fair working conditions and employment standards; 
information and consultation rights at company level, and; 
restructuring of undertakings. And furthermore that 
“each Party shall have in place and maintain a system for 
effective domestic enforcement and, in particular, an effective 
system of labour inspections in accordance with its international 
commitments relating to working conditions and the protection of 
workers; ensure that administrative and judicial proceedings are 
available that allow public authorities and individuals with standing to 
bring timely actions against violations of the labour law and social 
standards; and provide for appropriate and effective remedies, 
including interim relief, as well as proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions” (pp. 200-01, emphasis added). 
Should a dispute arise between the UK and EU, then the invocation of 
a resolution procedure would refer the matter to an independent 
arbitration panel (UK-EU Draft Trade Agreement, Article INST.15: 
Establishment of an arbitration tribunal), consisting of three persons 
with requisite expertise in law and international trade, selected (or 
drawn by lots) from approved lists from both sides (ibid. Article 
INST.16: Requirements for arbitrators). That such an opaque 
mechanism should have been agreed by both sides was allegedly due 
solely to the UK’s insistence to exclude the European Court of Justice 
from any arbitration role over disputes. 
Third, and perhaps foremost, the deal can be considered as 
representing an unstable equilibrium (to use the parlance of 
economics), as in essentially being a free trade agreement (FTA) that 
commits both parties to a zero-tariff, zero-quota trade regime in the 
movement of goods (with some notable exceptions such as seed 
potatoes[6]), to all intents and purposes, it excludes the 80% or so of 
the UK economy that is comprised of services, and leaves open key 
issues in areas such as the nature of data transfer between the UK 
and EU and also the degree of equivalence for financial services 
(though at present these are both unilaterally within the remit of the 
EU to determine). 
Thus, my preliminary assessment from examining certain aspects of 
the draft trade agreement is that the UK, despite the noises 
emanating from Whitehall (and the support of the hard Brexit 
European Research Group of MPs, whose vote in favour of the trade 
agreement appears based on the dubious notion that a “robust” UK 
Government could disregard commitments to a level playing field) will 
largely remain in the regulatory orbit of the EU. 
However, with aspects of the agreement still be fully operationalised 
and how it will operate in practice still to be seen, it is clear that 
discussions will go on and on. It’s not over yet. 
 
[1] https://www.euractiv.com/section/uk-europe/news/uks-eu-question-
is-settled-johnson-says-as-new-trade-pact-agreed/ 
[2] Although this in itself is hardly unreasonable – as external factors 
impinging on aspects of an agreement could change, both parties 
would require scope to review aspects of an agreement on a periodic 
basis. However, it does point to the obvious fact that trade 
agreements are not set in stone, but can be renegotiated over time, 
as Donald Trump demonstrated in renegotiating the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 2018 to US advantage 
(see https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/business/trump-nafta-
usmca-differences.html). 
[3] TITLE XI: LEVEL PLAYING FIELD FOR OPEN AND FAIR 
COMPETITION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. Article 1.1: 
Principles and objectives. 
[4] Sic. “in accordance with the precautionary approach, where there 
are reasonable grounds for concern that there are potential threats of 
serious or irreversible damage to the environment or human health, 
the lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
preventing a Party from adopting appropriate measures to prevent 
such damage”. Page 180, Article 1.2: Right to regulate, precautionary 
approach and scientific and technical information. 
[5] Page 200, Chapter six: Labour and social standards 
[6] https://www.potatonewstoday.com/2020/12/24/post-brexit-eu-
trade-deal-worries-mount-as-british-seed-potatoes-are-excluded/ . 
What is noteworthy here is that the EU ban on the export of seed 
potatoes was based on the premise mentioned by the UK DEFRA that 
“there is no agreement for GB to be dynamically aligned with EU 
rules” (see https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-55433319), 
reiterating that the nature of regulatory alignment could be 
problematic going forwards. Suffice to say, that the seed potato 
industry is over-represented in Scotland will play into the hands of the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) in fuelling further support for Scottish 
independence from the UK. 
